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This study investigates exchange rate movements in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of 
the European Monetary System (EMS) and in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II). On 
the basis of the variant of the target zone model proposed by Bartolini and Prati (1999) and 
Bessec (2003), we set up a three-regime self-exciting threshold autoregressive model 
(SETAR) with a non-stationary central band and explicit modelling of the conditional 
variance. This modelling framework is employed to model daily DM-based and median 
currency-based bilateral exchange rates of countries participating in the original ERM and 
also for exchange rates of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia from 1999 to 
2004. Our results confirm the presence of strong non-linearities and asymmetries in the ERM 
period, which, however, seem to differ across countries and diminish during the last stage of 
the run-up to the euro. Important non-linear adjustments are also detected for Denmark in 
ERM-2 and for our group of four CEE economies. 
JEL Code: F31, G15, O10. 
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1. Introduction 
The seminal paper of Krugman (1991) focused on explaining the exchange rate behaviour of a 
currency with a central parity rate and upper and lower exchange rate bands, the so called 
target zone model. The existence of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) provided researchers with an ideal opportunity to test the target zone 
model because it provided ample data for empirical analysis. Since the early 1990s, numerous 
papers have been written on the period preceding the ERM crisis of 1993
1, while the period in 
the run-up to the euro has received less attention.
2 However, further analysis of the post-1993 
experience would appear to be fruitful for, at least, two reasons. First, Flood, Rose and 
Mathieson (1990) and Rose and Svensson (1995) reported only limited non-linearity in the 
period prior to 1993. However, the widening of the fluctuation bands from ± 2.25% to ± 15% 
in the post-1993 period may have introduced additional non-linear behaviour into exchange 
rate behaviour. Second, the recent enlargement of the European Union to 25 countries implies 
that the New Member States would participate, at some point in time, in an ERM-2 
arrangement, prior to their adoption of the euro. For them, there may be useful information 
contained in the behaviour of ERM currencies prior to the introduction of the euro in 1999. 
The empirical literature on target zones suffers from a number of problems. First, most 
studies use monthly or weekly frequencies, which may ‘aggregate out’ the true dynamics of 
the exchange rate process. Second, the frequent jumps in the central parity in the ERM are not 
adequately accounted for in the pre-1993 period. Finally, either the mean
3 or variance 
equation
4 is investigated in a more sophisticated way instead of modelling them jointly. 
The aim of this study is to shed additional light on exchange rate behaviour in ERM, 
ERM-2 and CEE countries. Our modelling framework is based on the target zone models set 
                                                 
1 Examples are Anthony and MacDonald (1998), Bessec (2003), Bekaert and Gray (1998), Chung and Tauchen 
(2001), Rose and Svensson (1995). 
2 See, for example, Anthony and MacDonald (1999), Bessec (2003) and Brandner and Grech (2002). 
3 For example, Bessec (2003) models the mean equation using a SETAR model.   3
out in Bartolini and Prati (1999) and Bessec (2003). These models predict the presence of soft 
bands within the officially announced large bands. More specifically, these models assume 
that the monetary authorities do not intervene in the proximity of the central parity. In this 
area, the exchange rate behaves like a random walk. However, the monetary authorities take 
policy action when the exchange rate is about to leave this corridor. Thus, the exchange rate 
exhibits mean reversion towards the soft band. However, it should be noted that, in reality, 
such band mean reversion could be the outcome of a number of factors, such as direct and 
indirect central bank interventions, moral persuasion, communication with the markets, 
stabilisation of market expectations, in the face of increased credibility of the monetary 
authorities, or because of an increased stability of the underlying fundamentals. This type of 
behaviour is best captured by a three-regime SETAR model in which we model conditional 
variance by means of a GARCH(1,1). The application of this model for daily data from the 
post-1993 ERM and ERM-2 does not only indicate the presence of a three-regime threshold 
model but also considerable asymmetries for the detected upper and lower bounds that delimit 
the soft band within the announced target zone. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 overviews the target 
zone literature and summarizes the principal features of this class of models. Section 3 sets 
out the econometric framework. Section 4 provides the description and a first analysis of the 
data used in the paper. Section 5 analyses the empirical results and Section 6 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
                                                                                                                                                         
4 Brandner and Grech (2002) use a simple AR process for the mean equation and use different GARCHG models 
for the variance equation.   4
2. Target Zone Models 
2.1. The Krugman Model: Perfect Credibility with Marginal Interventions 
The baseline target zone model presented in Krugman (1991) is based on a 
continuous-time representation of the flexible-price monetary model in which the exchange 
rate (e) is assumed to be a linear function of a set of fundamental variables ( f ) and the 
expected change of the exchange rate ( dt de E / ) () :
5 
dt / ) de ( E f e γ + =          ( 1 )  
The fundamentals explicitly considered by Krugman (1991) are money supply and velocity. 
Money supply is controlled by the monetary authorities, whereas velocity is exogenous. First, 
it is assumed that the announced fluctuation band around the central parity is perceived by 
market participants as fully credible. Perfect credibility implies that neither the fluctuation 
bands nor the central parity would be altered and that the exchange rate would remain inside 
the fluctuation band. Second, it is assumed that the monetary authorities only intervene when 
the exchange rate hits the upper or lower bound of the officially announced fluctuation band. 
The implication of the second assumption is that the exchange rate behaves within the 
fluctuation band as under a free float. Because velocity is assumed to follow a standard 
Wiener, or Brownian motion, process without drift
6 and because the money supply is 
considered constant under a free float (with the expected change in the exchange rate being 
equal to zero) the nominal exchange rate also follows a Brownian motion and depends 
proportionally on the fundamentals, i.e. velocity.  
Under the assumptions sketched out above, the general solution of the model becomes 
the following: 
                                                 
5 Recall that under the assumption of uncovered interest parity, the standard discrete-time form of the monetary 
model can be written as:  
e
t t t t t t e *) y y ( * m m e 1 + ∆ + − − − = β α with α, β >0, m and m* denoting domestic 
and foreign money supply, y and y* standing for domestic and foreign output and 
e
t e 1 + ∆ representing the 
expected change in the nominal exchange rate in period t for period t+1. 
6 This is indeed the continuous-time representation of a random walk.   5
) f exp( B ) f exp( A f e ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + = µ µ       ( 2 )  
where A and B are constants, 
2 2 f / σ λ µ ⋅ = ,  f σ is the standard deviation of the 
fundamentals and λ  denotes the elasticity of real money supply to the interest rate in the 
structural form of the monetary model. Equation (2) is composed of a linear and a non-linear 
part. The linear part, f , represents the solution for a free-float. However, the main results of 
the model, which came to be known as the honeymoon effect and smooth pasting are reflected 
in the non-linear part, ) f exp( B ) f exp( A ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ µ µ . The honeymoon effect refers to the 
phenomenon that if the exchange rate is close to the weaker (stronger) edge of the band, the 
probability increases that the exchange rate will hit the edge, which automatically leads to 
interventions by the monetary authorities. As a consequence, the probability that the exchange 
rate appreciates (depreciates) is higher than the probability that it depreciates (appreciates). 
This is depicted in Figure 1. From this it follows that the exchange rate will be less 
depreciated (appreciated) given by the line TT than the level that would be given by the 
fundamentals alone (linear component of equation (2)) under a free float (45-degree line FF). 
Thus, this type of target zone model stabilises the exchange rate relative to its fundamentals 
within the fluctuation band. Smooth pasting refers to the phenomenon that the path of the 
exchange rate smoothes out on its way to the boundaries of the band and its slope becomes 
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Figure 1. The Krugman Model 
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A crucial implication of the baseline Krugman model is that the exchange rate will spend 
more time close to the boundaries than inside the target zone. Consequently, the distribution 
of the exchange rate will be U-shaped between the upper and lower bounds. Lundbergh and 
Teräsvirta (2003) demonstrate for the case of Norway from 1986 to 1988 that provided the 
two main assumptions are satisfied, i.e. the target zone is perfectly credible and the monetary 
authorities intervene only at the edges of the target zone, the Krugman model is able to 
describe surprisingly well the exchange rate behaviour in Norway in the period considered. 
2.2. Extensions of the Krugman Model
7 
Target zone exchange rate regimes may not be fully credible because the central parity 
may be realigned and the fluctuation bands widened. If realignment causes a shift in the band 
which does not overlap with the previous band, the exchange rate will jump. This may or may 
not be the case if there is an overlap between the old and new bands. Numerous realignments 
took place, for instance, within the ERM
8 and also in transition countries such as Poland and 
                                                 
7 For a very detailed presentation of the extensions, see e.g. Svensson (1992) and Kempa and Nelles (1999). 
8 Note that no realignment took place for Greece and Denmark in the ERM-2.   7
Hungary
9. Given such discontinuities, a number of attempts have been made to relax the 
assumption of perfect credibility and allow for jumps in the central parity. Table 1 
summarises the main features of the different extensions and Figure 2 gives the distribution of 
the exchange rate within the officially announced fluctuation bands. 
Table 1. Overview of different models and their implications 
 Prices  Credibility  Intervention  HM  SP  Distribution 
Krugman (1991)  Flexible  Perfect  Marginal  K  K  U-shaped 





Marginal      





Marginal <FF  <FF  U-shaped 
Delgado and Dumas 
(1992) 
Flexible Perfect  Continuous 
intramarginal 
<K <K  Hump-shaped 
Beetsma and Ploeg 
(1994) 
Sticky Perfect  Continuous 
Intramarginal 
<K <K  Hump-shaped 
Bessec (2003)  Flexible  Perfect  Two regimes      Twin peak 
Notes:  HM= honeymoon effect, K denotes the honeymoon effect and smooth-pasting under the Krugman 
solution. <K (<FF) signals the respective effects being smaller than in the Krugman model (free float). 
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2.2.1. Imperfect credibility with exogenous realignment risk 
Bertola and Caballero (1992) allow for exogenous realignment risk. The central parity (c), set 
to zero in the Krugman model is now considered to become part of the aggregate fundamental 
variable:  c v f + Γ − =  where vis a stochastic term and Γ is the fundamental. The monetary 
                                                 
9 In Hungary, the central parity was devalued 23 times between 1990 and 1995 (prior to the introduction of the 
crawling peg system). Within the framework of the crawling band regime in Poland, the central parity was 
devalued three times between 1991 and 1993 and was re-valued in 1996 (independently from the ongoing daily 
devaluations).   8
authorities will defend the currency with probability (1-p) when it reaches the edges of the 
band and will proceed with realignment of the central parity with probability p. Realignment 
is assumed to be reflected in a shift of the band. The general solution of the model is now as 
follows:  
)) c f ( exp( B )) c f ( exp( A f e − ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ + = µ µ      (3) 
The model with exogenous realignment risk implies that under certain circumstances 
(p>=0.5), both the honeymoon effect and smooth pasting disappear. 
2.2.2. Imperfect credibility with endogenous realignment risk 
Clearly, the fact that realignment risk is modelled as exogenous and that realignment only 
takes place when the exchange rate is at the edges of the band may be too restrictive and need 
not apply in reality. Tristani (1994) and Werner (1995) set out to model realignment risk as 
endogenous by assuming that the probability of realignment is a positive function of how far 
the exchange rate is located from the central parity - the larger the distance, the higher the 
probability of realignment. The general solution of their model is given by: 
)) c f ( exp( B )) c f ( exp( A )
w
p
( ) c f ( c e − ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ − = − µ µ
λη
1  (4) 
where  p , η and  wstand for the size of realignment, the probability of a realignment (which is 
a function of the deviation from the central parity) and the width of the target zone, 
respectively. Figure 3 shows that a result of the model is that the S curve becomes steeper 
(line T’T’) when compared to the S curve obtained from the Krugman model (Figure 1.). This 
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Figure 3. Endogenous Misalignment Risk 
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2.2.3. Perfect credibility with intramarginal interventions 
The second main assumption of the Krugman model could fail because the monetary 
authorities may wish to intervene within the band (i.e intra marginal intervention) and not just 
in case the exchange rate hits the upper or lower edges of the band (marginal intervention). 
Mastropasqua et al. (1988) and Delgado and Dumas (1992) argue that about 85% to 90% of 
total interventions took the form of intramarginal intervention in the ERM before the crises in 
1992 and 1993. Regarding the post-crisis period, the exchange rate never hit the upper or 
lower bound of any of the participating countries, which implies that all interventions were 
necessarily intramarginal.
10 As a result, it comes as no surprise that the distribution of the 
exchange rate is usually found to be hump-shaped for currencies participating in ERM and 
ERM-2, suggesting that the exchange rate spends most of the time in the middle of the band 
rather than close to the boundaries of the target zone. 
Considerable effort has been made to build target zone models that are able to account 
for intramarginal interventions. For example, Delgado and Dumas (1992) modify the 
                                                 
10 Brandner and Grech (2002) provide some summary statistics on the intervention activity of the participating 
countries’ central banks after 1993.   10
Krugman model so as to account for intramarginal interventions, which are assumed to take 
place continuously inside the target zone if the exchange rate deviates from the central parity. 
The solution provided by Delgado and Dumas (1992) is: 
v v v
) f f ( p
)







































where M is the hypergeometric function and  0 f  being the fundamental’s value when the 
exchange rate is equal to the central parity. Figure 4 shows the main result of the model: 
although the honeymoon effect diminishes considerably (line T’T’) when compared to the 
honeymoon effect under perfect credibility and marginal intervention, the exchange rate is 
nonetheless still less volatile than under free-float.
11 Similarly, smooth pasting is also 
substantially reduced in this set up because market agents know that monetary authorities 











0 , which happens to be the case of managed floating without fixed boundaries. 
In such a setting, all interventions would qualify as intramarginal. The solution shows that the 
exchange rate is stabilised compared to the free-float position and interventions induce a mean 
reversion of the exchange rate towards the central parity (line F’F’). Put differently, even in 
the absence of a formal target zone-type of exchange rate arrangement, central bank 
interventions can stabilise the exchange rate relative to the case of a free-float. 
                                                 
11 Note that this is not necessarily the case in a multilateral target zone with intramarginal interventions. For 
example, Serrat (2000) shows that in such a setting , exchange rate volatility can be larger than under a free float.    11
Figure 4. Intramarginal Interventions 
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2.2.4. Sticky prices with intramarginal interventions 
A major drawback of the models presented above is that they are based, without 
exception, on the flexible-price monetary model, which assumes that purchasing power parity 
(PPP) holds continuously. However, it is a well-established fact that PPP does not hold 
continuously
12, and therefore some kind of rigidities should be introduced into the modelling 
framework. Following the example of the Dornbusch overshooting model, Miller and Weller 
(1991) introduce sticky prices into the Krugman model. In addition to sticky prices, Beetsma 
and Ploeg (1994) complete the model with intramarginal interventions and show that sticky 
prices coupled with intramarginal interventions leads to a hump-shaped distribution of the 
exchange rate within the target zone. 
2.2.5. Unofficial bands within the target zone 
Bessec (2003) proposes that it is unlikely that monetary authorities would be willing to 
intervene continuously, independently of the distance of the exchange rate from the central 
parity. Instead, she argues that it is more likely that monetary authorities do not intervene in 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Rogoff (1996) and MacDonald (1995,2004).   12
the immediate neighbourhood of the central parity and allow the exchange rate to fluctuate in 
a given corridor around the central parity. Only if the exchange rate exits this corridor do the 
monetary authorities step in to intervene. This kind of regime can be described by the 
combination of the Krugman model and the Delgado and Dumas model. For example, 
consider  U e  and L e , which denote, respectively, the upper and lower bounds within the band 
beyond which the monetary authorities intervene in order to bring back the exchange rate to 
the central parity. The solution is thus a combination of the free-float Krugman solution, if 
U L e e e ≤ ≤ , and the Delgado and Dumas solution in case the exchange rate is below the lower 














e e if solution _ DUMAS DELGADO
e e e if solution _ float free _ KRUGMAN
e e if solution _ DUMAS DELGADO
e      (6) 
Notice that the upper and lower regimes need not have equal parameters because the 
monetary authorities may have asymmetric preferences. Table 1 hereafter summarises the 
main features of the different models and the corresponding exchange rate distributions are 
plotted in Figure 2. 
Although the theoretical model suggests that it is only intramarginal interventions by 
the monetary authorities that create a band of inaction, it is worth noting that, in practice, a 
large number of other factors may also be responsible. Such factors are the ability of the 
monetary authority to stabilise the national currency by other policy actions. Second, moral 
persuasion and appropriate communication towards the markets are also likely to influence 
the exchange rate. More particularly, market expectations and the credibility of the monetary 
authorities are likely to play a big role. If the monetary authorities are credible, it may suffice 
                                                 
13 Bartolini and Prati (1999) develop a different model that may be able to capture such behaviour. In particular, 
they argue that there is a narrow, unofficial band within the officially announced band. The narrow band is soft 
in that its boundaries are not only not publicly announced but also they change given that  a moving average rule 
based on past values of the exchange rate is assumed. This set up is indeed very close to reality given that the   13
to intervene in very small amounts in the market to persuade agents that the exchange rate 
will remain stable. Or, even better, the possibility of market intervention and a well 
established track record of the monetary authorities may bring about relative exchange rate 
stability. Finally, expectations may also be stabilised because of fundamentals becoming 
increasingly stable, or because of expected future developments of the fundamentals. This 
kind of effect may have played a special role in the run-up to the euro in the late 1990s, when 
the markets expected a high degree of macroeconomic convergence to occur across countries. 
Therefore, the band of inaction could be viewed as a band where the exchange rate dynamics 
resemble a random walk process whereas outside the band, the above factors can result in the 
exchange rate mean reverting. In the remainder of the paper, when using the expression ‘band 
of inaction’, we have this broader interpretation in mind. 
3. Econometric Issues: The SETAR-GARCH model 
In this section, we propose a simple non-linear time series model with local non-
stationary behaviour but overall ergodic characteristics, which is a discrete-time 
representation of the mixed-solution model proposed by Bessec (2003). The model aims to 
detect the non-stationary behaviour of the exchange rate within an official band ( 2 ψ , 1 ψ ), 
when it stays within the band of inaction
14 around the officially announced central parity, 
while allowing for global mean reversion towards the band of inaction contemplated by the 
monetary authorities. The specification we propose is a simple three-regime self-exciting 
threshold autoregressive (SETAR) model with a central band in which the variable behaves 
like a unit root process.
15 The errors in the specification have a simple GARCH (1,1) structure 
in order to account for the time-varying variance and volatility clustering observed in the data. 
                                                                                                                                                          
European Monetary Institute and the ECB evaluated the criterion on exchange rate stability on the basis of a 10-
day moving average. 
14 In practice, there are a number of factors that may lead to the emergence of a band of inaction, as explained in 
section 2. 
15  The SETAR-GARCH model proposed presents a more parsimonious specification than the STAR 
parametrization in Lundbergh and Teräsvirta (2003), and appears as a special case of the latter if the thresholds   14
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where the error term, εt, is assumed to follow a GARCH (1,1) process, 






− − ⋅ + ⋅ + = t t t σ β ε α γ σ ,          ( 8 )  
where It refers to the information set available in period t. Notice that if λi∈(-1,0), i=1,2, for 
suitable values of χ0 and π0, yt will present overall mean reverting features to the band (φ 1 , 
φ 2), which is assumed to be contained in the official band ( 2 ψ , 1 ψ ).  Inside the band, 
however, the variable behaves as a unit root process with GARCH errors. A homoskedastic 
version of this model is used in Bessec (2003) to assess the dynamics of the exchange rate of 
selected countries within ERM. 
We intend estimating the model given by (7) - (8) in the following way. For a given 
series yt , the model is estimated setting the values of φ 1 and φ 2 to actual realizations of yt in 
the sample (say starting with the tenth and ninetieth percentile of the empirical distribution of 
yt). The process is repeated for all combinations of φ 1 and φ 2 corresponding to realized 
values (after ensuring that a minimal percentage of the observations falls in the central band) 
and the pair (y1 , y2) corresponding to the model with a minimal sum of squared residuals is 
chosen as the estimator of (φ 1,φ 2). Given the estimates of the threshold values, which are 
constant over time, and which delimit the band, the estimation of the full model is 
straightforward using maximum likelihood methods.
 16 
                                                                                                                                                          
correspond to the official target zone bands. In our modelling strategy, however, we allow for an intramarginal 
band of inaction whose limits need not correspond to the officially stated ones, and that is actually estimated. 
16 The optimal lag length for the autoregressive component is determined using the Schwarz information 
criterion.   15
In our analysis, we obtain the estimates for the thresholds that define the band using a 
grid search over the realized values of yt after trimming 10% in the extremes of the empirical 
distribution of yt. The grid search was carried out at 5% steps, ensuring that at least 20% of 
the observations fall in the nonstationary regime defined by the band.
17 
An important issue that needs to be taken into account explicitly is how to test the 
significance of the the simple unit root against non-linear model.
18 Due to the fact that the 
threshold parameters φ 1 and φ 2 are not identified under the null hypothesis of a linear unit 
root process with GARCH errors, the usual likelihood ratio test statistic for testing this 
hypothesis against the alternative of a SETAR model such as (7)-(8) does not have a standard 
limiting distribution (for literature on this problem, see Andrews and Ploberger, 1994, 
Hansen, 1996, 2000; Caner and Hansen, 2001, consider the problem when the underlying 
stochastic process has a unit root). We therefore intend carrying out the test using a bootstrap 
procedure in the spirit of Hansen (2000) and Caner and Hansen (2001). Let T be the sample 
size. First, we compute the standard likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic, 
), log (log 2 UR TAR L L LR − =  
where LTAR is the likelihood of the model given by (7)-(8) and LUR is the likelihood of the 
linear unit root model given by  
,
1
0 t k t
K
k
k t y y ε θ θ + ∆ + = ∆ −
= ∑          ( 9 )  
where the error term is assumed to follow a GARCH (1,1) process such as the one given in 
(8). With the estimated parameters of model (9) (including the estimated GARCH 
parameters), we simulate T observations of yt under the null of linearity. A linear unit root 
                                                 
17 This means that for both the lower and the upper bound threshold, the search is performed from the 10
th 
percentile to the 90
th percentile of the distribution. This is much more general than what is done, for instance, in 
Bessec (2003) who searches from the 5
th to the 35
th percentile of the distribution for the lower bound threshold 
and from the 70
th to the 95
th percentile for the upper bound threshold. 
18 To a certain extent, the choice of the unit root model as the null hypothesis could be considered arbitrary, but it 
appears as a natural model to which the SETAR-GARCH model should be compared if we consider the time 
series properties of the exchange rate series.   16
model and a SETAR model are estimated using these simulated data, and the likelihood ratio 
test statistic, 
S
n LR , is computed.
19 This procedure is repeated N times and the bootstrap p-
value for the null of a unit root process against the alternative of a SETAR model such as (7)-







n LR N / ) LR LR ( I p
1
, 
where  ) (⋅ I  is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the argument is true and zero 
otherwise. That is, the p-value corresponds to the proportion of simulated likelihood ratio test 
statistics that exceed the value of the test statistic computed with the actual data.
20 The 
bootstrap test was carried out using N=500 replications. 
 
4. Data Issues 
4.1. Data Description 
The dataset contains average daily deviations of nominal exchange rates vis-à-vis the 
prevailing central parity
21. The currencies considered are of countries which participated in 
the system: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Although the ECU was the official currency of the ERM, it 
is widely acknowledged that ERM was centred around the German mark. Therefore, we use 
exchange rate series vis-à-vis the German mark and these data were obtained from the 
Bundesbank.
22 In its convergence report of 1998, in the run-up to the euro, the European 
                                                 
19 Given that it is not ensured that the replicated data will actually cross the estimated thresholds, the SETAR 
models for the simulated data are estimated setting the thresholds at the quantiles of the replicated series 
corresponding to the estimated thresholds obtained with the actual data. 
20 Notice that the bootstrap test used is a simple example of the non-pivotal bootstrap testing procedures 
described in Pesaran and Weeks (2001) for non-nested model testing. 
21 Notice that the central parity of the Spanish and the Portuguese currencies were devalued vis-à-vis the German 
mark on March 6, 1995 by 7% and 3.5%, respectively. That is, the deviations from the central parity are obtained 
using the central parity prevailing prior to March 6, 1995 and then the devalued central parity from March 6, 
1995 onwards. The Irish pound was revalued by 6% on March 16, 1998. This realignment is, however, outside 
the period investigated in this paper. 
22 See appendix for Datastream codes.   17
Commission used the median currency
23 as the benchmark currency for the assessment of the 
criterion on exchange rate stability. To our knowledge, the median currency has not been used 
in any previous study aimed at testing target zone models.
 Thus, we also look at the deviations 
vis-à-vis the median currency.
24 For the German mark, the time period is the post-1993 crisis 
period: it begins in September, 1 1993 and ends in February, 28 1998. Although Austria 
officially entered the ERM after its entry to the EU in 1995, the period from 1993 is 
investigated for this country because it maintained a tight peg with respect to the German 
mark for this period
25. Using the extended data for Austria allows us to investigate whether or 
not the ERM entry provoked a change in exchange rate behaviour. The series are shorter for 
Finland and Italy, which joined/re-entered ERM, respectively, on October 15 and November 
25, 1996. For the median currency,
26 the series runs from March 1, 1996 to February 28, 
1998.  
For ERM-2, only Denmark is considered and deviations vis-à-vis the central parity 
against the euro are taken for the period January 4, 1999 to April 28, 2004.
27. The source of 
the data are the ECB.
28 
Finally, we also analyse the exchange rate behaviour of four CEECs. The exchange 
rate against the euro is studied for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. For the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, the period starts in January 1, 1999 when the euro was 
introduced. For these two currencies, the deviation against the period average is used because 
                                                 
23 “(…) median currency is (the currency) which has an equal number of currencies above and below it within 
the grid at the official ecu fixing on any given day ” (European Commission, 1998, p. 123). In more practical 
terms, for each participating country, the deviation of the bilateral exchange rate against the ECU from its 
official ECU central parity is determined. Subsequently, the countries are ranked and the 6
th out of the 11 
participating currencies is chosen in the ranking. It should be noted that the median currency is chosen on a daily 
basis, implying that the currency chosen as the median currency could have changed day-by-day. 
24 In addition to the ecu, the German mark and the median currency, three other benchmarks could be, in theory 
used: (a) the strongest currency of the system, (b) bilateral exchange rates with no benchmark currency and (c) 
the synthetic euro. 
25 As a matter of fact, Austria had a pegged exchange rate regime vis-à-vis the German mark since the late 
1970s. Austria entered the ERM at the fixed peg exchange rate regime it unilaterally maintained beforehand. 
26 We are grateful to André Verbanck from the European Commission (DG ECFIN) for providing us with these 
data series. 
27 Greece is excluded because of its ephemeral stay in ERM and ERM-2.   18
they have been having managed floating. The period begins on March 1, 2000 (close to the 
outset of free floating, April 12, 2000) for Poland and on May 4, 2001 (the widening of the 
bands to +/-15%) for Hungary. On June 4, 2003, the central parity was devalued by some 
2.26%. As in the case of Portugal and Spain, the deviations vis-à-vis the pre- and the post-
devaluation parities are determined. For all four countries, the sample runs to April 28, 2004. 
Data are drawn from the ECB for the Czech Republic and Poland, from the National Bank of 
Hungary for Hungary and from Datastream for Slovakia. 
4.2. A Preliminary Analysis of the Data 
The distribution of the exchange rate within the target zone are estimated using the 
Epanechnikov kernel density function for 1993 to 1998 (and 1996 to 1998 for Finland and 
Ireland)  vis-à-vis the German mark, for 1996 to 1998 for the median currency and for 1999 to 
2004 for the euro. Figures reported in Appendix 2 reveal two important features of the data.  
First, a considerable part of the distributions exhibit a double-hump shape. This is especially 
the case for the Austrian Schilling, the Danish koruna, the Dutch Gulder, the French frank, the 
Irish pound and the Portuguese escudo vis-à-vis the deutschemark. With the exception of the 
Spanish peseta and the Dutch gulder, all currencies have a hump shaped distribution vis-à-vis 
the median currency.  
Brandner and Grech (2002)
29 report kernel density estimations for DM purchases and 
sales for 6 countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Ireland and Portugal. 
Although the period investigated includes some of the turmoil in August 1993,
30 their graphs 
match remarkably well with our kernel estimates reported in the Appendix for the period from 
1993 to 1998. For Belgium, they show increase DM sales at the central parity whereas DM 
purchases occurred at about 0.2% -0.3% in the stronger side of the fluctuation band. For 
                                                                                                                                                          
28 See appendix for Datastream code. 
29 Brandner and Grech (2002), p. 23. 
30 Their sample covers August 2, 1993 to April 30, 1998 while our period spans from September 1, 1993 to 
February 28, 1998.    19
Denmark, the monetary authorities proceeded with increased DM purchases at 2% from the 
central parity in the weaker side and sold DM at the central parity. For France, DM purchases 
and sales are reported to take place respectively at about 5% and 1% away from the parity on 
the weaker side. Regarding Ireland, the monetary authorities reportedly sold DM at 5% from 
the parity on the weaker side and bought DM at 10% from the parity on the stronger side. For 
Portugal, the interventions at about 4% from the central parity on the weaker side and at 2% 
from the parity on the stronger side are also broadly in line with exchange rate developments. 
As for Spain, DM sales are found to occur mostly at 10% from the central parity on the 
weaker side. A reason for this finding is that Brander and Grech (2002) start the period in 
August 1993 during the crisis during.  
For the series against the euro, a marked twin peaked distribution is to be observed for 
the Czech koruna, and to a lesser extent for the Danish and Slovak currencies. This provides 
us with some preliminary evidence on the presence of non-linearity of the type described by 
the SETAR model.  
The second characteristic of the data is the asymmetric distribution. For the ERM, a 
large part of the distribution of the Austrian, Danish, French and Portuguese currencies is 
located on the weaker side of the band. By contrast, the exchange rate was most often on the 
stronger side of the band for Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. This holds true, in 
particular, for the end of the period under study. Regarding the euro series, both countries 
with formal target zone arrangements, namely Denmark and Hungary, had their currencies 
predominantly on the stronger side of the band. 
5. Empirical results 
The SETAR – GARCH(1,1) model described earlier was applied first to the exchange 
rate series vis-à-vis the German mark, for countries participating in ERM. We first took the 
whole post-1993 (after the ERM crisis) until the announcement of the final conversion rates in   20
early 1998. Then, the estimations were repeated by decreasing the period by one year in each 
step until the beginning of the reference period taken for the convergence report of the 
European Commission and the European Monetary Institute is reached.
31 Subsequently, the 
period was shortened by yearly steps, while maintaining the starting date fixed.
32 Finally, the 
two subperiods determined by the devaluation of the central parity are analysed for Portugal 
and Spain.
33 
From the results reported in Table 2a and Table 2b, a number of interesting points 
emerge. First, the analysis of the estimated upper and lower bounds of the band of inaction 
shows that there are two groups of countries. The first group consists of countries which have 
very narrow bands for the entire period. For instance, for the whole period, the absolute 
bandwidth is 0.05% for Austria, 0.35% for Belgium and 0.15% for the Netherlands.
34 The 
scale of these ranges remains largely unchanged for the subperiods. This is not surprising 
given the fact that these countries shadowed very narrowly the monetary policy of the 
Bundesbank and sought to stabilise their currencies relative to the German mark accordingly. 
The results for Austria deserve special attention. Notwithstanding the fact that Austria 
formally joined the ERM only in 1995, the estimated upper and lower bounds are very stable 
over time lending, supporting the proposition that exchange rate behaviour was not affected 
by Austria’s entry into the ERM. 
The second group, comprising the rest of the countries has considerably larger bands. 
The absolute width of the estimated band was 3.66% for Portugal, 1.28% for France, 3.46% 
for Denmark, about 4% for Spain and roughly 10% for Ireland for the period from 1993 to 
1998. With the exception of Ireland, the estimated bandwidth decreases towards the end of the 
                                                 
31 The following three periods were considered: September 1, 1994 to February 28, 1998; September 1, 1995 to 
February 28, 1998; March 1, 1996 to February 28, 1998. 
32 The following three periods were considered: September 1, 1993 to September 1, 1997; September 1, 1993 to 
September 1, 1996; September 1, 1993 to September 1, 1995. 
33 September 1, 1993  to March 5, 1995 and March 6, 1995 to February 28, 1998. 
34 Notice that the estimation method ensures that at least 20% of the observations fall in the band of inaction.   21
period: below 1% for Denmark, France and Spain, and close to 2% for Portugal. For Ireland, 
the estimated bandwidth rises from about 4% from 1993 to 1995 to nearly 8% from 1993 to 
1997 and then drops to 2% at the end of the period (1996 to 1998). Note that Italy and 
Finland, which entered ERM only in 1996, had bandwidths comparable to that in Belgium 
and the Netherlands.
35 
The second observation regards the position of the estimated band of inaction relative 
to the officially announced central parity. Regarding the narrow-band countries, the estimated 
effective fluctuation band is mostly located symmetrically from the central parity for Austria, 
and mainly on the stronger side for Belgium. In the Netherlands, the whole band is always 
located on the stronger side. Note also that the Italian and Finnish currencies are also found to 
be situated on the stronger side. For the second group of countries, we note that the 
boundaries of the estimated exchange rate bands are mostly located on the weaker side of the 
official target zone for Denmark and France. For both countries, the narrowing down of the 
band manifested itself with the estimated weaker threshold moving closer to the central parity. 
Although the Portuguese escudo was located on the weaker side at the beginning of the 
period, the estimated band shifted entirely to the stronger side by the last period. For Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, the estimated band was on the weaker side from the official parity and 
moved to the stronger side of the official fluctuation band by the end of the period.
36 
Third, the estimated autoregressive terms ( upper λ ;  lower λ ), indicating mean reversion to 
the upper and lower edges ( upper φ ;  lower φ ), have in the majority of cases the expected negative 
                                                 
35 Our results can be directly compared with those reported in Bessec (2003), who uses monthly data for the 
Belgian, Danish, French, Irish and Dutch currencies against the German mark. Bessec (2003) estimated a time-
varying threshold model for the period from 1979 to 1998 with the threshold changing in 1993 when the 
fluctuation band widened. The comparison of the threshold obtained for the post-1993 shows that our method for 
searching the thresholds, coupled with the use of daily data, gives more precise threshold values. Although the 
thresholds are very similar for Belgium, our thresholds differ greatly from the ones reported in Bessec(2003), 
Table 5, for the other countries. 
36 Our results are at odds with the findings of Bessec (2003) - Table 5, since she finds that both the upper and 
lower mean reversion coefficients are always significant for all countries and because her estimated coefficients 
are much larger in absolute terms than ours.   22
sign, but they are not statistically significant in a number of cases. Generally, they are more 
significant for the entire period and then become less so towards the end of the period. 
However, a more detailed examination of the results indicates considerable heterogeneity 
across countries. For Austria, the mean reversion to the band detected for the whole period 
seems to be unstable because the estimated coefficients are systematically insignificant for the 
sub-periods. Similarly, no significant band mean reversion could be found for Italy.  
For the Netherlands and Spain, both coefficients are negative and significant for most of the 
sub-periods. With regard to Spain, two different regimes are hidden behind the band mean 
reversion behaviour detected for the whole period if the time of the devaluation of the central 
parity is considered as the dividing line for the two sub-periods. The estimated band is 
situated from 4.04% to 8.34% away from the official central parity on the weaker side before 
the devaluation and is located from 0.99% on the stronger side from the official parity to 
1.74% on the weaker side from the official parity.  
For some countries, the mean reversion to the band seems to be one sided. For 
instance, there is mean reversion only towards the estimated upper (stronger) bound in 
Belgium, Denmark and Finland, and only towards the lower edge of the estimated band for 
France and Portugal. This could be an indication of the presence of different pressures for 
different countries. In Belgium, and Finland, the estimated upper and lower bounds are mostly 
on the stronger side. Thus, the market situation may have been one to avoid excessive 
appreciation. By contrast, in France, the estimated lower boundary to which the mean 
reversion occurs happens to be on the weaker side. The analysis of the sub-periods shows, 
however, that there is two-sided mean reversion from 1993 to 1997, and one-sidedness is the 
feature of the period from 1996 to 1998. Hence, to counteract depreciation pressures and to 
bring the lower bound closer to the central parity may have been typical for these countries. 
The fact that the coefficients become insignificant for the period from 1996 to 1998 could   23
suggest that by that time, non-linearity diminished and the exchange rate started behaving like 
a linear process in the face an increased credibility during the run-up to the euro. The decrease 
in non-linearity is also confirmed by the p-values, which show that in some cases the three-
regime SETAR model is no better than the linear unit root specification. 
Fourth, the ARCH and GARCH terms (α  and β ) of the conditional variance equation 
are correctly signed ( 0 0 > > β α ; ) and statistically significant at the 1% level for almost all 
cases. At the same time, the sum of these two parameters is very close to, or larger, than unity, 
implying that the error terms are integrated GARCH processes for most of the series. 
Interestingly, the α coefficient is found to be insignificant for the Austrian schilling against 
the German mark for 1996 to 1998 and for the Spanish peseta vis-à-vis the median currency. 
Given that β  is very close to unity, especially for Spain, it may lend support to the hypothesis 
of constant conditional variance (for insignificant estimates of γ) or linearly changing variance 
(if γ is significant) in a deterministic fashion.  
The results obtained on the basis of the median currency for the period from 1996 to 
1998 are reported in Table 3. They appear similar to those noted for the German mark. The 
estimated upper and lower bounds, the width and the location of the band for the median 
currency are comparable to those obtained using the German mark. However, it is possible to 
detect more non-linearity than when using the German mark. This is especially the case for 
Austria and Belgium. Also, the median currency approach allows us to look at Germany, for 
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Table 2a. Model estimates using the German mark 
  period   k  
upper φ   lower φ   upper λ   lower λ   α   β   value p −
ATS_DEM 1993-1998  1  0.02% -0.03%  -0.0703*** -0.0785**  0.0383***  0.9527*** 0.002 
ATS_DEM 1994-1998  2  0.02% -0.03%  -0.1307*** -0.0826**  0.0399***  0.9383*** 0.000 
ATS_DEM 1995-1998  1  0.02% -0.03%  -0.1235** -0.1075  0.0505*** 0.9131***  0.000 
ATS_DEM 1996-1998  1  0.00% -0.03%  0.0308 -0.1056  0.0341 0.8711***  0.000 
ATS_DEM 1993-1995  1  0.04% 0.02% -0.0036 -0.0118 0.0465* 0.9073***  0.002 
ATS_DEM 19931996  1  0.04% 0.00% -0.0276 -0.0544**  0.0582***  0.9074***  0.000 
ATS_DEM 1993-1997  1  -0.02%  -0.04% -0.0101  0.0021  0.0408***  0.9474*** 0.000 
BEF_DEM 1993-1998  7  0.30% -0.05%  -0.126*** -0.011  0.0931*** 0.903*** 0.038 
BEF_DEM 1994-1998  1  0.26% -0.06%  -0.0924*** -0.0016  0.0771***  0.9161*** 0.002 
BEF_DEM 1995-1998  1  0.29% -0.07%  -0.0847** 0.0808  0.0172*** 0.9711***  0.066 
BEF_DEM 1996-1998  1  0.17% -0.07% 0.0167  0.039  0.0144*  0.9728*** 0.078 
BEF_DEM 1993-1995  7  0.13% -1.12%  -0.0667* 0.0423  0.446*** 0.5866***  0.004 
BEF_DEM 19931996  8  0.27% 0.04% -0.0834** -0.0001  0.1259*** 0.8795***  0.014 
BEF_DEM 1993-1997  7  0.27% -0.04%  -0.1021*** -0.0152  0.1082***  0.8949*** 0.058 
DKK_DEM 1993-1998  1  0.09%  -3.55% -0.0856* 0.0193** 0.1323***  0.8794***  0.002 
DKK_DEM 1994-1998  1  0.01%  -2.46% -0.0905** -0.0736***  0.135***  0.8767***  0.000 
DKK_DEM 1995-1998  1  -0.06% -1.21% -0.0703** -0.0347  0.0649*** 0.924*** 0.000 
DKK_DEM 1996-1998  1  -0.33% -1.19% -0.0723*** -0.0677  0.053***  0.9448*** 0.000 
DKK_DEM 1993-1995  1  -2.61% -3.27% 0.0149  0.0011  0.1669***  0.846***  0.018 
DKK_DEM 19931996  1  -2.06% -3.55% -0.0309** 0.0207**  0.1579*** 0.8605***  0.004 
DKK_DEM 1993-1997  1  -0.03% -3.27% -0.1429** -0.0024  0.136***  0.8767***  0.004 
NGL_DEM 1993-1998  3  0.52%  0.37%  -0.0745*** -0.0029  0.073***  0.9307*** 0.002 
NGL_DEM 1994-1998  1  0.54%  0.31%  -0.0824*** -0.0191**  0.0986***  0.9066*** 0.000 
NGL_DEM 1995-1998  1  0.57%  0.01%  -0.0675** -0.1395** 0.1178*** 0.8917***  0.008 
NGL_DEM 1996-1998  1  0.45%  0.24%  0.0432** -0.0289***  0.1274***  0.8828***  0.002 
NGL_DEM 1993-1995  3  0.60%  0.37%  -0.0988* -0.1278**  -0.0056  0.9981***  0.006 
NGL_DEM 19931996  1  0.65%  0.60%  0.0233 -0.0119  0.0577***  0.9302***  0.000 
NGL_DEM 1993-1997  1  0.52%  0.25%  -0.0693*** -0.0341  0.0647***  0.9159*** 0.002 
FRF_DEM 1993-1998  1  -0.69%  -2.01%  0.0016 -0.0219***  0.1014***  0.9066***  0.032 
FRF_DEM 1994-1998  1  -0.74%  -1.88%  -0.0002 -0.0122 0.1048***  0.9058***  0.006 
FRF_DEM 1995-1998  1  -0.76%  -2.71%  -0.0009 -0.0599 0.0759***  0.9244***  0.028 
FRF_DEM 1996-1998  1  -0.73%  -1.61%  0.0008 -0.1815**  0.07***  0.9304***  0.004 
FRF_DEM 1993-1995  1  -2.22%  -4.33%  -0.003 -0.0831  0.1032***  0.9024***  0.010 
FRF_DEM 19931996  1  -2.20%  -4.74%  0.0017 -0.1561**  0.0974***  0.9011***  0.010 
FRF_DEM 1993-1997  1  -0.90%  -3.86%  -0.0796*** -0.0777*** 0.1012***  0.8989*** 0.014 
Notes: k is the lag length used in the AR process,  upper φ and  lower φ represent the upper (stronger) and lower (weaker) limits 
of the band of inaction, towards which the exchange rate exhibits mean reversion and positive (negative) figures refer to a 
position on the stronger (weaker) side of the officially announced band; upper λ and  lower λ  stand for the autoregressive 
coefficients, which capture mean reversion; α and β are the ARCH and GARCH coefficients from the conditional variance 
equation. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The p-value is for the null of an AR 
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Table 2b. Model estimates using the German mark 
  period   k  
upper φ   lower φ   upper λ   lower λ   α   β   value p −
IEP_DEM 1993-1998  1  4.75%  -5.35%  -0.0655*** -0.0346  0.1018***  0.8012*** 0.000 
IEP_DEM 1994-1998  1  5.99%  -4.49%  -0.0756*** -0.0612*  0.132***  0.7986*** 0.004 
IEP_DEM 1995-1998  1  9.03%  6.60%  0.1883*** 0.0059  0.1923*** 0.7628***  0.000 
IEP_DEM 1996-1998  4  8.90%  6.55%  0.0595 0.0052 0.2956***  0.6569***  1.000 
IEP_DEM 1993-1995  1  -0.39%  -4.47%  -0.0055 -0.0828*  0.0545***  0.9239***  0.006 
IEP_DEM 19931996  1  -0.37%  -3.04%  -0.0114 -0.0336*  0.0541***  0.9321***  0.004 
IEP_DEM 1993-1997  1  3.89%  -4.06%  -0.059*** -0.0488*  0.0288*** 0.9566***  0.006 
ESP_DEM 1993-1998  1  -0.99%  -3.72%  -0.0473*** -0.0805*** 0.0942***  0.9186*** 0.000 
ESP_DEM 1994-1998  1  0.83% -5.70%  -0.0628*** -0.102***  0.1257***  0.8968*** 0.004 
ESP_DEM 1995-1998  1  1.04% 0.21% -0.0223  -0.0103  -0.0017*** 0.9986*** 0.038 
ESP_DEM 1996-1998  1  1.16% 0.84% -0.024 -0.0125  0.1015***  0.9016***  0.000 
ESP_DEM 1993-1995  1  -1.75%  -7.99%  -0.0664 -0.5411***  0.1319***  0.8391***  0.010 
ESP_DEM 19931996  1  -1.60%  -6.44%  -0.0237* -0.1449***  0.2226***  0.7174***  0.018 
ESP_DEM 1993-1997  1  0.70% -4.03%  -0.0665*** -0.078***  0.1081***  0.8963*** 0.000 
ESP_DEM Pre  real  1  -4.04%  -8.34% -0.0988*** -0.4876*** 0.2962***  0.7747*** 0.004 
ESP_DEM Post  real  1  0.99% -1.74% -0.0461**  -0.0815*** 0.0138***  0.9813*** 0.000 
PTE_DEM 1993-1998  1  -0.08%  -3.74%  -0.0031 -0.2597***  0.104***  0.9069***  0.002 
PTE_DEM 1994-1998  1  -0.32%  -3.32%  -0.0023 -0.1757***  0.1092***  0.9024***  0.008 
PTE_DEM 1995-1998  1  1.76% 1.14% -0.0553 -0.0112*  0.0734***  0.927***  0.018 
PTE_DEM 1996-1998  1  1.89% -0.26%  -0.0694* 0.0016  0.0821***  0.9204***  0.016 
PTE_DEM 1993-1995  1  -3.69%  -4.52%  -0.0088 -0.7588***  0.1594***  0.8379***  0.000 
PTE_DEM 19931996  1  -0.79%  -3.88%  -0.1195 -0.3029***  0.1065***  0.8947***  0.000 
PTE_DEM 1993-1997  1  0.09% -3.88%  -0.0328** -0.3086***  0.1037*** 0.8937***  0.000 
PTE_DEM Pre  real  1  -3.28%  -4.62% -0.0145  -0.0916  0.209***  0.8215*** 0.000 
PTE_DEM Post  real  1  -0.31%  -1.86% -0.0019  -0.0977*** 0.0649***  0.9354*** 0.010 
ITL_DEM 1996-1998  1  1.37%  0.99%  -0.0615 -0.0306 0.1771***  0.8302***  0.040 
FIM_DEM 1996-1998  1  1.97% 1.60% -0.2884*** -0.005  0.2269***  0.7971*** 0.008 
Notes: as for Table 2a. 
 
Table 3. Model estimates using the median currency,  
March 1, 1996 to February 28, 1998 
  k  
upper φ   lower φ   upper λ   lower λ   α   β   value p −
ATS_MED 2  -0.02%  -0.28%  -0.5608*** -0.0903  0.4342*** 0.701***  0.002 
BEF_MED 2  0.00%  -0.29%  -0.0712***  -1.2519***  0.3596***  0.4464***  0.004 
NLG_MED 2  0.39%  0.00%  -0.0055  0.0005 0.4888***  0.4986*** 0.004 
DKK_MED 8  -0.29%  -1.23%  0.0081 -0.2593  0.208***  0.8211*** 0.000 
DEM_MED 3  -0.04%  -0.26%  -0.7665*** -0.3688*** 1.0702*** 0.3854***  0.000 
FRF_MED 1  -0.74%  -1.02%  -0.0186** -0.0137  0.2769***  0.769***  0.002 
ESP_MED 1  1.09%  0.59%  -0.0424  -0.0195  -0.0043  1.0006***  0.000 
PTE_MED 1  1.73%  0.58%  -0.0633  -0.0694***  0.1447***  0.8717***  0.002 
IEP_MED 1  9.18%  6.80%  0.2163***  0.0001  0.197***  0.7524***  0.000 
ITL_MED 1  0.94%  0.35%  -0.1091  -0.0812  0.1682***  0.8416***  0.010 
FIM_MED 1  1.28%  0.86%  -0.0866*** -0.0659  0.2005*** 0.8262***  0.004 
Notes: as for Table 2a. The period begins on October 4, 1996 for Finland and on November 15, 1996 for Italy. 
 
Finally, we now turn to the estimation results for the currencies expressed against the 
euro, for the period 1999 to 2004.  During the period when the Danish krone was in ERM-2, 
the estimated bandwidth decreases further from the 0.8% figure, reported above, in the   26
original ERM period to 0.4%. However, the mean reversion coefficient bears the correct sign 
and is significant only for the lower bound.  
For the CEE countries against the euro we find the following. Hungary is an 
interesting case because on May 4, 2001, it widened the fluctuation bands around the central 
parity.
37 From May 2001 to April 2004, the estimated upper and lower thresholds were 
located, respectively, 11% and 6.76% away from the central parity (both on the stronger side 
of the official fluctuation band of ±15%). The mean reversion coefficients have a negative 
sign and are significant. This would seem to give strong support for the fact that exchange rate 
policy targeted a narrow band, which it judged compatible with the inflation target. However, 
this is only part of the story. On June 4, 2003, the central parity was devalued by some 2.26%, 
which triggered considerable depreciation of the currency inside the band. Looking at the 
period from May 4, 2001 to June 3, 2003 reveals that until the devaluation of the central 
parity, mean reversion was significant only on the upper (stronger) threshold. So, mean 
reversion to the lower threshold detected for the whole period may refer to the post-
devaluation period.  
According to the statement of the Monetary Council of the National Bank of Hungary, 
dated August 18, 2003, “the Monetary Council puts the equilibrium exchange rate, which 
foster rapid economic growth without endangering price stability in the range of 250 to 260 
forints per euro”. Relative to the then prevailing central parity of 282.36 forint per euro, this 
means a band of 7.92% to 11.46% on the stronger side of the official fluctuation margins. 
Thus, the estimated band for the whole period from 2001 to 2004 (upper bound=11%; lower 
bound=6.76%) is broadly in line with the implicit target of the Hungarian monetary 
authorities. 
                                                 
37 Note that the crawling peg system was abandoned only on October 1, 2001. However, at the time of the 
widening of the fluctuation band from ±2.25% to ±15%, the rate of crawl was already very low, 0.00654% a day, 
amounting to a total devaulation of the central paritiy of around 1.12% until October 1, 2001. Therefore, we 
believe that this did not have an impact on the behaviour of the exchange rate within the band.   27
As shown earlier, a special case of the Delgado-Dumas solution is tantamount to 
managed floating without officially announced target zones, which could also induce some 
non-linear behaviour in the exchange rate. In particular, if the monetary authorities are 
targeting an implicit target zone, the SETAR model should be particularly useful to detect it 
because in such a case, interventions would be undertaken only if a depreciation or 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate exceeded a given pain threshold of the monetary 
authorities. This may be the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which have de jure and 
de facto managed floating. Notwithstanding the official free floating regime of the Polish 
zloty vis-à-vis the euro, we may still expect some mean reversion behaviour towards a band 
of inaction. Results reported in Table 4 confirm our suspicion about the presence of non-linear 
behaviour. However, the mean reversion appears to be one-sided. There are signs of 
significant mean reversion only on the strong side for the Czech Republic and Poland, and 
only on the weak side for Slovakia. The mean reversion of the Czech koruna and the Polish 
zloty may actually reflect the recent switch from huge nominal appreciation to a large 
depreciation of the two currencies. The width of the estimated band is close to 7% for the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, which is in sharp contrast with the detected wide band of more 
than 17% for Poland, lending more empirical support for more active exchange rate policies 
in the two former countries.  
Likewise for the period preceding the introduction of the euro, there appears to be 
strong integrated GARCH effects in the conditional variance for all cases. 
Table 4. Model estimates using the euro 
  period k  
upper φ   lower φ   upper λ   lower λ   α   β   value p −
DKK_EUR 1999-2004  1  0.38% -0.01% 0.0051 -0.2474*** 0.1368*** 0.8464***  0.004 
CZK_EUR 1999-2004  1  1.70% -5.73% -0.0109**  -0.0134 0.0808*** 0.8599***  0.038 
SKK_EUR 1999-2004  1  2.30% -4.16% -0.0025 -0.0779**  0.1678*** 0.7223***  0.018 
ZTY_EUR  2000-2004  2 10.26% -7.14% -0.0445**  -0.0045 0.1259*** 0.8204***  0.006 
HUF_EUR 2001-2004  1 11.00%  6.76% -0.1165*** -0.3748**  0.4443*** 0.5412***  0.000 
HUF_EUR 2001-2003  1 12.35% 11.00% -0.2249***  0.0125 0.5858*** 0.5473***  0.000 
Notes: as for Table 2. 
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6. Confronting the Results with Intervention Data 
The results presented earlier provide ample empirical evidence in support of a mean 
reversion towards a band even though in some cases mean reversion only occurs on one side 
of the estimated band. In this section we link these observations with the theoretical 
underpinnings of our estimated model in which the mean reversion is driven by intra-marginal 
interventions of the monetary authorities. We use the intervention dataset (including DM 
purchases and sales) of Brandner and Grech (2002) for Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, to try to address this question. Figure 5 illustrates the major, 
unidirectional interventions over the whole period for the six currencies. 
For Belgium, interventions clearly took place within our band of 0.3% to –0.05% over 
the whole period. Our econometric results indicate that there is significant mean reversion 
only on the stronger side of the estimated band. Indeed, most of the interventions up to 1996 
can be observed in a range of 0.2% to 0.4% from the central parity. However, strikingly for 
our model, although two third of the interventions materialised in the form of DM purchases, 
about one third of the interventions were DM sales, thus backing the home currency on the 
stronger side. It is also notable that the most important DM-sales interventions in terms of 
volume occurred during, and in the aftermath, of the 1993 crisis, namely between August and 
October, which eventually helped to revert the exchange rate towards the central parity from 
the weaker side. 
Regarding Denmark, most of the observations for interventions are well within our 
estimated band of 0.09% to –3.55%, and, remarkably, mean reversion to the band on the 
weaker side appears to have occurred without the help of any observable official intervention. 
Roughly the same applies for France: mean reversion to the band is chiefly detected on the 
weaker side. In this context, what merits some attention is the two major DM purchasing 
waves by the monetary authorities in the course of mid-1995, which pushed the exchange rate   29
towards the direction of the central parity on the weaker side of the band. Similarly to France, 
no clear pattern of interventions can be detected for Spain. However, this is perhaps not 
surprising given the weak evidence in favour mean reversion to the band. 
For Ireland, the monetary authorities did not intervene till early 1995. From 1995 to 
early 1997, interventions mostly took the form of DM sales backing the home currency. 
However, DM purchases also appeared sporadically. A number of the interventions took place 
well within our estimated band. A major wave of DM purchases is observable in 1997 when 
the Irish pound appreciated substantially against the DM. Clearly, this pushed the currency 
back towards the central parity. However, the two other larger peaks of appreciation in late-
1997 and early 1998 were offset without any apparent official intervention. 
Turning to Portugal, which is the only country (for which we have intervention data), 
where mean reversion is largely in line with intervention data. Within our estimated band of 
inaction, the monetary authorities hardly ever intervened. At the same time, when the 
Portugese escudo was weaker than the estimated band, the monetary authorities sold DM, thus 
underpinning the domestic currency. In early 1997, when the escudo started appreciating, the 
monetary authorities purchased huge amounts of DM, which eventually stopped the trend 
appreciation. From that moment onwards, the escudo reverted to the band, and the monetary 
authorities sought to smooth out this reversion by selling DM.   30
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In this paper, we have applied a three-regime SETAR model with GARCH errors to 
daily exchange rate data for countries participating in post-1993 ERM and ERM-2, and for 
selected CEE economies. The underlying idea of the theoretical model is that the monetary 
authorities do not intervene in the proximity of the central parity where the exchange rate 
behaves like a random walk. However, the exit of the exchange rate from this band of inaction 
on either side triggers policy action by the monetary authorities, which forces the exchange 







































































































































































DM purchases no interventions
 at all




































































































































































 of the central parity  33
We have argued that such a modelling framework is better suited to capturing 
exchange rate dynamics in a target zone, particularly the ERM variant of a target zone, than 
the frameworks used in previous research because it captures mean reversion to a band of 
inaction within the official target zone and gives a more realistic description of the behaviour 
of ERM currencies. A further novelty of our work is that in addition to using DM-based 
bilaterals we also use median currency-based bilaterals for the original ERM period. Given 
the way in which the ERM was supposed to work, the latter bilaterals are the more 
appropriate in any  target zone modelling of this system. 
For the ERM experience we are able to place the countries in two groups depending 
on the size of the bandwidth. For Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, we found very 
narrow and very stable thresholds delimiting the band of inaction. This holds true for Italy and 
Finland for the period they re-entered/joined the ERM in 1996. Also, for these countries, the 
estimated bands were usually located on the stronger side of the official band. For the second 
group of countries - Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal and Spain - the estimated bandwidth 
is substantially higher for the whole period but it decreases towards the end of the period. 
Simultaneously, we observe a shift of the bands either toward the central parity or into the 
stronger part of the official fluctuation bands. Although we find evidence in favour of 
reversion towards the band, this reversion partly disappears by the end of the period. In the 
paper, we divided the whole period into sub-periods to account for time-varying threshold 
values. A future avenue for research would be to estimate time-varying break points to tackle 
this issue 
For Hungary, we detected a narrow band of 7% to 11% on the stronger side of the 
official band. We have also shown that reversion to the band occurred to the upper threshold 
before June 4, 2003 when the central parity was devalued, and mean reversion happened to 
the lower and the upper threshold for the whole period. For the other CEE countries which   34
have not been pursuing a policy of explicit exchange rate bands we find evidence of non-
linear exchange rate behaviour and the observed mean reversion is one-sided. 
Overall, there appears to be strong evidence in favour of a mean reversion towards a 
band even, although the extent of this reversion is very heterogeneous across countries. 
Confronting our results with intramarginal intervention data for six countries participating in 
the ERM highlights several important points. First, the monetary authorities intervened often 
within the estimated bands, except for Portugal. Second, interventions were used to smooth 
out short-term fluctuations instead of targeting an implicit band. Third, in some cases larger 
intervention (relative to the average of the whole period) turned out to be effective in turning 
an exchange rate trend. Fourth, in some cases, mean reversion to the band occurred in the 
absence of official intervention in the foreign exchange markets. These results would seem to 
imply that official interventions are not a panacea for addressing exchange rate turbulence. In 
reality, mean reversion to the band could be the outcome of a range of factors, such as direct 
and indirect central bank interventions, moral persuasion, communication with the markets, 
stabilisation of market expectations in the face of increased credibility of the monetary 
authorities or because of an increased stability of the underlying fundamentals. However, 
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Annex: 
I. Datastream codes: 
 Source  DEM  Source  EURO 
Austria Deutsche  Bundesbank  DMATSSP  Denmark  European Central Bank  DKECBSP
Belgium Deutsche  Bundesbank  DMBECSP  Czech Rep.  European Central Bank  CZECBSP
Denmark  Deutsche Bundesbank  DMDKKSP Hungary  European Central Bank  HNECBSP
Finland  Deutsche Bundesbank  DMFIMSP  Poland  European Central Bank  POECBSP
France Deutsche  Bundesbank  DMFRFSP  Slovakia  Datastream  SXEURSP
Ireland Deutsche  Bundesbank  DMIEPSP     
Italy Deutsche  Bundesbank  DMITLSP     
Netherlands Deutsche  Bundesbank  DMNLGSP      
Portugal Deutsche  Bundesbank  DMPTESP     
Spain Deutsche  Bundesbank  DMESPSP       
   38
 
II. Distribution of exchange rate deviations from central parity 
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